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Abstract
"Pensions as Severance Pay"
Earlier claims that pensions serve as severance pay are cor-
roborated by a new data set drawn from the 1980 Banker's Trust
corporate pension plan study. A model is developed that shows how
pension values which vary with the age of retirement make both
workers and firms better off by moving the equilibrium in the
direction of a perfect-information, first-best optimum. This
requires that pension values decline with the age of retirement
beyond a certain point. Evidence from the 1975 and 1980 data sets
supports this claim. To the extent that any significant change has
occurred between 1975 and 1980, most important is that the ratio
of early retirement pension value to normal retirement pension value
has increased.
Edward P. Lazear
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
(312) 962—7464When wages equal marginal product and workers are risk—neutral, severance
pay is not merely superfluous——it is harmful. However, when either of these
conditions is violated severance pay becomes an important part of an optimal
compensation scheme. For example, if the contemporaneous wage exceeds
marginal product then workers prefer to remain with the firm even when it is
inefficient to do so. Severance pay causes the worker to leave the job more
frequently and a judiciously chosen combination of wage and severance pay can
induce efficient quitting behavior.
Pensions which vary with the date of retirement can be thought of as a
form of severance pay. If the expected present value of the pension declines
with later retirement, then the worker sacrifices some benefits to remain on
the job. Stated conversely, firms appear to be willing to pay a larger
pension value (stock, not flow, of course) to workers who retire early. These
larger pensions can be interpreted as severance pay since they induce the
worker to leave the job more frequently than he would in the absence of such a
structure.
This view of pensions is quite different from the one that holds that
pensions are a way to save at before—tax rather than after—tax rates of
interest. Although there must be some truth to the notion that pensions
function as a tax—free savings account, this view alone is inconsistent with
the finding (presented below) that the expected value of the pension stream
declines with increased age of retirement. Since nothing is withdrawn
explicitly from the account until retirement, the value of pension benefits
should be strictly increasing in age of retirement under the savings account
interpretation of pensions. The widespread existence of pensions which
decline with age of retirement is evidence for the notion that pensions act as
a form of severance pay to insure efficient labor mobility.2
Below, a theory of severance pay is presented and specific implications
of that theory to pensions are derived. The theory is tested using data which
I generated using the 1980 Bankers' Trust Corporate Pensions Plans Study. The
results are then compared to those obtained using a similar data set for 1975
which was analyzed in a previous study (Lazear (1981)).
The major findings are:
(1) Although severance pay does not always guarantee efficient labor
mobility, approximately chosen severance pay moves the economy in the
direction of the perfect information optimum under almost all circumstances.
(2) Most major pension plans in both 1975 and 1980 pay a larger expected
present value of pension benefits for early retirement. This is consistent
with the view that pensions act as severance pay, but inconsistent with the
notion that pensions are merely a tax—deferred savings account.
(3) The structure of pensions between 1975 and 1980 does not appear to
have changed dramatically. Either ERISA'S (1974) effect was almost fully
captured by the 1975 data or it did not have a significant effect on pension
values.
(4) There was about a 50% increase in the average nominal value of
pensions across the board between 1975 and 1980. Additionally, there was over
a 100% increase in the value of pensions taken ten—years before the date of
normal retirement for pattern skews. This may have been a reaction to changes
inthe AgeDiscrimination in flnployment Act which restricted mandatory
retirementclauses.3
The Model
The first task is to derive a simple model of severance pay.1 To begin,
consider a two—period world in which workers are risk neutral. The terms of
trade between the worker and firm are set in period zero and work, if it
occurs at all, takes place during period one. For the moment, we do not
elaborate the reasons for setting up a contractual arrangement when a spot
market might appear to perform as well or better. Simply take the two—period
construct as given.
Define the wage at which trade occurs in period one as W ,theworker's
value to the firm as V and the value of his alternative use of time as A.
If work takes place, the worker receives W ,butwork does not occur in the
event of a "quit" or "layoff," each of which is determined unilaterally. A
worker quits if and only if A > W and the firm lays the worker off if and
only if V < W
Work is efficient whenever A < V •Underthese circumstances,
appropriate transfers could make all parties better off if work occurs. But
ifW equals neither Anor V ,workwill not always occurwhenitis
efficient.To see this, consider figure 1. Work is efficient whenever the
realization of V,A lies to the southeastof the A =Vline.Suppose that
thewage which is negotiated is W •Theworker quits whenever A > W or
whenever the realization of A is above the horizontal line at W •Someof
these quits are efficient since the worker quits when A > W > V and when
A > V > W ,bothof which imply that A > V so that the separation should
occur. But some of those quits are inefficient since the worker also quits
when V > A > w •Thesepoints are shown in the triangle labeled "inefficient
quits." The problem is that the worker can unilaterally determine a







hisalternatives are relatively good, he is worth even more to society at his
current job.
The converse is also true. The firm unilaterally determines that a
layoff occurs whenever V <W•Inthe diagram, layoffs occur whenever the
realization of V is to the left of the vertical line at V =W•Someof
these layoffs are efficient because the firm lays the worker off when
W > A > V and when A > W > V ,bothof which imply that A > V •Sothat a
separation should occur. But some are inefficient because the firm also lays
workers off when W > V > A ,shownin the triangle labeled "inefficient
layoffs." The problem here is that the firm can unilaterally determine a
separation and it has no incentive to take into account the fact that although
the worker is worth little to the firm, his alternative use of time is even
lower.
Labor market situations seem to resemble this simple set—up. Workers
have better information about their alternatives than firms and firms have
better information about the worker's worth to the firm than the worker.
Wages or wage profiles are somewhat rigidly fixed in advance so that the
bilateral monopoly situation which arises after the values of A and V are
known does not lead to costly negotiation about how rent is to be split.
Now consider the role of severance pay. Suppose that the argreement
which is negotiated at time zero includes the provision that work takes place
atwage W ,butthat a payment S is made from firm to worker if a
serpartionoccurs •2Theworker quits if f A +S > Wor if f A > W -S•The
firmlays the worker off if f W —V> Sor iff V > W —S
Ifboth Wand S arefreeto vary, severance pay adds nothing to the
analysis.We can simply define W =W-Sand the previous discussion
carries over perfectly to this case as well.5
Severance pay is interesting when W or S is not free to vary so that
the wage that minimizes the loss due to inefficient separation either is
infeasible or is undesireable by some other criterion. In the static context,
the division of rent provides a motivation for a separate wage and severance
pay. Since V > A automatically implies that rent is generated as the result
of trade, that rent must be split up. It is desireable that the way in whic
rent is shared should not affect the allocation of resources. A two—part wage
is sufficient to bring this about. The worker receives S even if no work
occurs so W -Sis the marginal payment for work and it is this value that
affects behavior.
For example, suppose that V V were known with certainty by all
parties. Then if g(A) is the density of A ,theexpected rent associated
with the activity is
V
V -fAg(A)dA
if no inefficient separation occurs. This value can be realized only if work
occurs whenever A < V •Ifthe marginal payment to work is set equal to
V ,alayoff never occurs and quits occur iff A > V .Thus,W —SmV
is efficient. The split of the rent is a bargaining problem, but it is clear
that any level of S chosen is consistent with W —SV since W is free
to vary •Thus,therent sharing arrangement pays Sandthe additional
degree offreedom provided by W insures separation efficiency.
A pension can be though of as this most simple fons of severance pay.
After signing the contract (becoming vested, perhaps), the worker can quit and
receive the pension S ,orhe can continue to work in which case he6
receives W —Sfor work plus a pension of S upon retirement. Below, we
enrich the definition of severance pay to encompass the more elaborate forms
that pensions take, but the simple notion that a pension may function as a
form of severance pay remains.
In this static context, the timing of S is inconsequential. It can be
paid during period zero or after period one so that the term "severance pay"
may be somewhat misleading. In the dynamic context, the timing of the payment
may be crucial. The fact that contracts are not costlessly enforced seems to
be a major part of the story and it is this aspect of the problem that makes
it necessary that the lump sum part of payment, the severance pay, be paid
after employment ceases.
One situation in which it is important that severance pay follow
employment arises when effort cannot be monitored costlessly. As has been
argued elsewhere (Becker and Stigler (1974 and Lazear (1979, 1981)), deferred
compensation can act as an incentive device to bring about an efficient amount
of effort on the job. A pension given upon retirement may be regarded as a
reward for service well done and the existence of such a reward induces
workers to avoid shirking over their worklives. But a pension awarded only
upon retirement is not, in general, the best way to produce this result. I
have shown that under a number of circumstances, it is preferable to combine
some pension upon retirement with an age—earnings profile which rises more
rapidly than worker productivity.
The difficulty associated with steeply rising age—earnings profiles is
that they distort the labor supply/separation decision. Mandatory retirement
is one institutional adaptation which has arisen to alleviate the harmful
effects of that distortion. But the problem is one which affects the worker





retirement. In the vocabulary of the earlier discussion, if W exceeds V
then the worker will not leave the job when it is efficient for him to do
so. The firm, on the other hand, is too anxious to rid itself of the
worker. If V is known to both worker and firm,thenit is easy to set up an
arrangement that will guarantee both optimal effort and efficient
separation. That scheme involves the use of an upward—sloping age—earnings
profile with some pension after retirement at the normal age. All separations
are initiated by workers except in the case of effort below the required
level. Under that circumstance, the worker is fired and loses the right to
draw high future salary and perhaps some pension device since the expected
present value of the pension, and therefore of the severance pay, varies with
age of retirement. Let us formalize the approach.
We broaden our model to consider a situation in which workers remain with
a particular firmfora number of periods. Define T as the period of
"normal"retirement. (As will beargued below, "normal" retirement is nothing
morethanthe modal age of retirement because with efficient severance pay,
workers leave the firm appropriately.) A typical profile with wage not equal
to marginal product is shown in figure 2. Here, wage, labeled W ,startsout
below worker's marginal product, V ,andthen rises above it. The distortion
occurs because the worker reacts to the relationship between his
alternative, A ,andW ,ratherthan to the relationship between his
alternative, A ,andmarginal product, V •Severancepay can eliminate the
distortion.
Utility maximization implies that a worker quits and accepts severance
pay if two conditions hold: (1) the present value of severance pay plus the
alternative stream exceeds the present value of the wage stream in the current8
firm and(2) the worker cannot do even better by delaying his retirement to








T0 (1 +r) r=O (1 +r)
where K is the number of years beyond normalretirementage that the
individual lives, S is the annual pension payment received from t until
death, if the worker retires at t and r is the discount rate.
To induce efficient quitting behavior, it is necessary that the 1.h.s. of
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choose T and PT-i so that
(2) T—1 ir WT_i -VT_i
Substitution of (2) into (1) yields the necessary and sufficient condition






Since this is the efficiency condition, the severance pay arrangement results
in efficient turnover.9
Now consider the decision at P -2•Theworker resigns at T —2if
and only if two conditions hold: First, the present value of retiring at
T —2and receiving severance pay must exceed the present value of continuing
to workuntilT —1and retiring then, taking the T -Iseverance pay.
Second, the present value of retiring at I -2with severance pay must
exceed the present value of working until T and taking the normal pension.
If we make the assumption that At > Vt implies At, > for
t'> t then the second condition becomes redundant (demonstrated below).
Consider the first condition: A worker retires at T -2rather than
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where ETI(AT_l) is the expectation of the alternative wage offer at I —1
given the information at T -2
For efficiency, it is necessary that the l.h.s. of (4) exceed the r.h.s.
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which is the efficiency condition.
Note also that if AT_2 > VT_2 ,theworker chooses retirement at
T —2over retirement at T •Thesecond condition is redundant. Since
AT_2 > V.._2 implies AT1 > VT1 ,theefficient pension plan already
insures that inequality (3) holds as well. Since the efficient pension at
T —1induced retirement at T —1wheneverA,,,_.1 > VT_i ,itis clear that
retirement at T —2dominates retirement at I —1
This provides a general statement of the efficient pension:
7) T-i+1_
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so
(8) T-i =E(WTT -VT] 1r)i-t +T
1=1 (l+r)
The terminal value, P1 ,isexogenous to this problem. It might be the
optimal pension to prevent shirking in the final,periodbefore retirement or
simply a rent-sharing parameter.11
It is through equations (7) and (8) that we derive our results. If the
wages of old workers exceed their marginal products, then the present value of
the pension falls as the age of retirement rises (eq.(7)). Similarly, eq. (7)
provides us with an estimate of the difference between W and V at each
point in time because PT-i and Ti +1are observed.
The case of postponed retirement is equivalent. Normal retirement is not
special once we allow pension benefits to vary with the date of retirement.
The date of "normal retirement" is likely to be the date of modal
retirement. In almost all cases that age is 65 and corresponds to the start
of social security payments. Since the social security earnings test causes
the A(t) function to take a discrete jump upwards at age 65. Except for
this detail, the analysis of postponed retirement is similar. The worker's
choice is still reflected by (1) so all holds as above with a replacement of
subscripts. Ifj is the number of years after "normal retirement" then
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Eqs. (7), (7') and (8) follow correspondingly so that an estimate of W -V
can be obtained for those years after T as well by examining the way in
which pension benefits decline in late retirement.
Let us summarize this section. The pension which acts as severance pay
reduces the true wage to V when we take into account the way that the
pension value falls with experience. Since the pension is not paid if the
separation is punishment for too little effort, incentives are maintained
while efficient turnover is produced. nployers are willing to buy out of a
long term contract if the wage rate exceeds VMP. The amount that employers12
are willing to pay reveals something about the difference between W and
V. Pensions may act as a buyout. If the valueofthe pension declines with
the age of retirement, this suggests that the pension plays the role of
severance pay.
Less than Perfect Separation Efficiency
The model discussed earlier allowed V to be random and unknown by both
parties. Under these circumstances, one instrument, in this dase the pension
stream P(t) ,isnot sufficient to eliminate all inefficient separation. The
reason is that when the firm uniquely knows the value of the worker to the
firm, the only way to make that information useful is to give the firm some
discretion over when work occurs. But to do this imineidately creates a
problem. Since the firm is anxious to sever the worker whenever V < W —S.
This leads to situations where A < V < W —Sso that a layoff occurs when a
separation is inefficient.
The introduction of a second instrument can alleviate some of this
difficulty. If different amounts of severance pay are paid depending upon who
initiates the separation, some inefficient layoffs and quits can be
eliminated. This raises two difficulties. First, it creates a situation
where each side tries to induce the other to initiate the separation. Second,
it generates inefficient retention as a bi—product. This occurs when
W -L< V < A < W -Q ,whereQ is what is paid to the worker as severance
pay if the worker initiates the separation and L is what is paid to the
worker if the firm initiates the separation. If L =Qthis condition can
never hold, but for L > Q ,inefficientretention occurs. This is discussed
in depth in Hall and Lazear (1982). It is also shown that it isnever optimal
to select L < Q since this results in needless inefficient separations.13
Perhaps because of these difficulties and those associated with determining
who actually initiated the separation, pensions rarely vary with the identity
of the initiating party.
Vesting
Vesting is an issue that always arises when pensions are discussed. This
seems especially relevant when one of the arguments for incorporating a
pension into the generalized compensation plan relates to incentives for
increased effort or reduced turnover. It is sometimes suggested that non—
vested pensions can reduce worker turnover whereas vested pensions cannot.
The model in the previous section should make clear the pointthat"vesting"
in and of itself has little meaning.
What vesting guarantees is that a worker is entitled to receive the
currently accured benefits. But currently accrued benefits may be small
indeed until the last few years before retirement. There are a number of
reasons which all derive from the large number of degrees of freedom inherent
in setting up a benefit formula. First, many benefit formulas d epend upon
final salary or an average of salaries earned in the last few years before
retirement. Since salary grows with age, and in an inflationary period, with
chronological time, the benefits received by a worker who leaves the firm at
age 30 may be much smaller than that received by the same worker who leaves at
age 65. Second, since length of service affects benefits, formulas can be
specified to make the accrual rate a convex function of years of service,
placing a premiiuu on long tenure. Third, as Bulow points out, a worker who is
vested, but below the age at which early retirement benefits can be received,
earns a promise of a pension at normal retirement age, not the benefits
themselves. Because of the higher value of pensions taken upon early14
retirement, remaining with the firm at least until theage of early retirement
election is generally lucrative.
In the same vein, the tendency of many plans togear pension benefits to
final salary is evidence for the incentive role of pensions. Most other
rationalizations for pensions (discussed below) at bestgear pensions to a
lifetime average rather than to an average of final salaries. Since final
salary can be adjusted to reflect worker effort, hours worked, and
productivity, the multiplier effect on the pension value may provide
significant incentives for workers to maintain effort and a high level of
hours worked during those final years.
The pirical Analysis:
Data
The data for this analysis were constructed using twosources; the
Bankers' Trust Study of Corporate Pension Plans, 1975 and the Bankers' Trust
1980 Corporate Pension Plan Study. Each of these studies consists ofa
detailed verbal description of the pension plans of over 200 of the nation's
largest corporations. The data sets apply to approximately 8 to 10 million
workers and this comprises about one—fourth of the entire coveredpopulation.
Firms are not identified by name in the descriptions. However,a
sufficient amount of detail is given about each firmsothat it was possible
to match firms up between the 1975 and 1980 samples. Forexample, the
descriptions report the industry in which the firm produces, the date at which
the pension plan was adopted and amended, and the number andtypes of
employees covered by the plan. Screening on the basis of these and other
criteria resulted in a longitudinal data set of 70 matched firms for thetwo
years in addition to the two cross—sections of 200+ firms for each year.15
The major empirical task was to covert the verbal descriptions into
machine readable data. This required setting up a coding system that was
specific enough to capture all of the essential detail associated with each
plan. After that was done, it was necessary to write a program which
calculates the present value of pension benefits at each age of retirement. A
brief summary of that approach follows.
Pension benefit formulas assume three different types. The two most
common fall under the rubric of defined benefit plans. A defined benefit plan
specifies the pension flow as a fixed payment determined by some formula. The
pattern plan awards the recipient a flat dollar amount per year worked upon
retirement. The conventional plan calculates the pension benefit flow from a
formula which depends upon years of service and some average salary. In
contrast to the defined benefit pians are the defined contribution plans where
the employer (or employee) contributes a specified amount each year during the
worklife to a pension fund. The flow of pension benefits that the worker
receives upon retirement is then a function of the market value of that
fund. The defined contribution plan is much less frequently used than is
either the pattern plan or conventional plan.
In order to test the theory exposited above, it is necessary to obtain
estimates of the expected present value of pension benefits for each potential
year of retirement. Specifically, the way in which pension values vary with
age of retirement must be calculated. Some plans do not permit the individual
to receive early retirement benefits or only permit early retirement up to a
given number of years before the normal date. This means that in order to
perform the necessary comparisons, sometimes plans had to be deleted from the
relevant sample so that the entire series of retirement values would be valid.16
It is important to realize that there are no real individuals in this
sample. Since the data sets discussed above are descriptions of pension
plans, the "individuals" below are hypothetical ones, created to perform the
necessary simulation exercises. For each plan, for each of the two years,
twelve "typical" employees were created, having all combinations of salary
upon normal retirement of $9000, $15000, $25000 and $50000 and of tenure of
10, 20 and 30 years in 1975 and 20, 30 and 40 years in 1980. Much of the
analysis below relates to these 2928 "individuals" from 244 plans in 1975 and
to the 2712 "individuals" from the 226 plans in 1980. Since this simulation
exercise was computationally expensive, a representative group was selected
having salary of $25000 and tenure of 30 years upon normal retirement. Many
of the comparative statics results below are derived from an examination of
the individuals in this representative sample.
In order to calculate the expected present value of retirement at each
age, two steps must be taken. First, for any hypothetical employee, the
pension flow that he receives upon retirement in any given year must be
calculated. Second, that flow must be converted into an expected present
value by discounting it appropriately and by taking into account the age—
specific death rates. Even the first step is far from straightforward.
Most plans have many restrictions on the maximumamountwhich can be
accrued and many provide for minimtm benefits. Additionally, a number reduce
pension benefits by some fraction of the social security benefits to which
some basic class is entitled. Moreover, a number of plans provide supplements
for retirement before the social seucirty eligibility age. Sometimes these
supplements relate directly to social security payments while at other times
they depend upon the individual's salary or benefit level.17
Other restrictions have to do with vesting requirements, with the maximum
age at which the individual begins employment, with the minimumnumber of
yearsservedbefore the basic accrual or particular supplements are
applicable. The accrual rate or flat dollar amount per year to which the
individual is entitled is often a nonlinear function of tenure and salary and
these kinks had to be programmed into the calculations.
In calculating retirement benefits, assumptions about wage growth for
older workers are crucial. All plans which are based on salary compute some
average of annual earnings over some relevant period. Therefore, it is
nominal earnings growth that will affect the pension values. Elsewhere
(Lazear 1981), I estimated earnings growth and found something that is well—
knownamong labor economists: earnings growthisoften negative in final
years because hours of work decline (primarily for health reasons) in the
final years before retirement. In the sample I examined based on CPSdata
fromthe mid—70's, the estimate of earnings growth for a particular synthetic
cohort was anywhere from —2% to -13% depending upon how the sample was
selected. Since more rapid wage growth will tend to make pension values
increase with the age of retirement, selecting higher rates of wage growth
tends to push the results against the theory of this paper. To be
conservative, I selected a wage growth rate of zero for most of the analysis,
and also recalculated pension benefits with a growth rate of positive 5%, well
above that actually observed in the data.
Since all values are nominal, the nominal interest rate should be used as
the discount factor. For most of the analysis, 10% was used, but 15% and 5%
were also tried in order to ascertain the sensitivity of the results to the
choice of discount rate. Although there were effects of varying the rates,
none of the qualitative conclusions was altered.18
Finally,in performing the actuarial correction, it was necessary to
choose a life table. The 1975 life table for Americans was used for the 1975
sample and the 1978 table was used for the 1980 sample. Both were obtained
from the U.S. Vital Statistics. The choice of table turns out to be the least
crucial part of the analysis. Values do not vary greatly from year to year
and discounting makes what small differences there are unimportant. What is
important, however, is the possibility that early retirees do not have the
same life expectancy of normal retirees. It is likely that many individuals
retire early as the result of poor health and consequently have higher age-
specific death rates. If this is true, then ignoring those differences will
tend to bias the results in the direction of higher pension values for early
retirees than is actually the case.
Findings
We start by discussing the data from the 1980 sample. Table 1 contains
some descriptive statistics. Notice that there is a tremendous amount of
variation in the present value of pension benefits even within each salary
tenure group. For all "workers" taken together the standard deviation is as
large as the mean. Within each salary—tenure group, the standard deviation is
around half of the mean. A simple rule of thumb suggests that the mean
pension value is about one—thirteenth of the product of final salary and
tenure at retirement. It is somewhat more than this for very low salary
workers and slightly less than this for high salary workers. This reflects
both the provisions for maximum and especially minimum pension values which
make the benefit structure progressive.
Beforegoingfurther,itis interesting to compare this to the cross—
sectionfrom1975. Those data are presented in table 2. Although the average19
pension value if smaller in 1975 than 1980, this is the result of differences
across groups. The 1975 data are constructed using hypothetical workers with
10, 20, and 30 years of tenure whereas the 1980 data are constructed using
hypothetical workers with 20, 30, and 40 years of tenure. In fact, within
each comparable salary—tenure group, the values for 1975 are significantly
higher than those for 1980. We defer until later discussion of the reasons
for this pattern. Another interesting difference is that the pattern is
significantly less progressive in 1975 than in 1980. In 1975, the rule that
the pension value equals about one-tenth of the product of final salaxy and
tenure seems to hold across all salary levels with only slight traces of
progressivity.
These findings do not suggest that pensions were larger in 1975 than they
are in 1980. There are two main reasons: First, firms are not matched across
years in these tables so that some of the difference may simply reflect random
sample variations. Second, final salaries were substantially higher in 1980
than in 1975 so the relevant comparison is not necessarily the one that holds
salary level constant.
In the context of the model, the most importantresultsrelate to the way
in which pension values vary with the age of retirement. Table 3 selects
those "individuals" in the 1980 sample who were permitted to retire at least
ten years before the normal age and traces the mean present value of pensions
for that group. EPV-10 refers to the expected present value of retiring ten
years before the normalage,and similarly for EPV—9...EPV—1. EPVO is the
presentvalue of retiring at normal age •Thetable is broken down by pension
benefit formula type and then by salary arid tenure level.
Firstexamine the first panel which relates to conventional plans. Note
that for all tenure—salary groups, the value of early retirement exceeds that20
of normal retirement (EPV-1O > EPV-9 > ...EPR—1 > PV0). For ease of
reading, ERAT(t) is defined as EPV(t)/EPRO so that ERAT> 1for all
t < 0 •Thisevidence supports the major prediction of the model: The
expected present value of pension benefits decline as the age of retirement
increases. Firms actually do "buy out" workers who retire early with higher
pensions. As such, the interpretation that pensions act as severance pay is
consistent with these results.
Further, ERAT—lO increases with tenure and salary. The buyout is
larger not only in absolute terms, but also in relative terms for employees of
longer service and of higher salaries. This is consistent with the
interpretation that an upward—sloping age—earnings profile acts as an
incentive device.
This is most easily seen by examining WVDIFF-10...WVDIFF-1 •WVDIFF(t)
is defined as WTt —VTtandiscalculated using the relationship shown in
eq. (7). WVDIFF>0 implies that the worker is being paid more than his
marginal product and it results whenever PT-i > PT—i +
1
•WVDIFF-1/SALARY
is the ratio of overpayment during the final year before retirement. That
ratio goes from 1/6 for workers in the group with salary =9000,tenure =20
to 1/2 for workers in the group with salary =50000,tenure40. This result
has a nice interpretation.
First consider tenure: Individuals with shorter tenure are those who
initiated their employment with the firmmorerecently. In the context of
figure 2, those workers are less likely to have wages which exceed their
marginal products. As the result, the buyout should be smaller. In fact, for
individuals whose tenure is below t in figure2, thebuyout should actually
be negative. (Although this occurs in a significant number of cases, it does
not occur frequently enough to make the means display an increasing pattern.)21
Second,high salary workers are those most likely to be performing jobs
where wage incentive schemes are useful. Since those may be the jobs which
are most difficult to monitor, a large penalty in the form of lost earnings is
likely to be an integral part of the optimal compensation profile for these
workers.
These points are also supported by consideration of panel 2 of table 3
which relates to pattern plan workers. It is also true that the general
tendency is for the pension value to decline with age of retirement. But the
decline does not seem to be as pronounced for these employees as for those
with conventional plans. In fact, for those with only 20 years of experience
atnormal retirement, the meansof WVDIFF—10, WVDIFF—9, and WVDIFF-8 are
actuallypositive reflecting location in terms of figure 2 before t •Since
most of these workers are blue collar workers where more direct monitoring is
possible,it is not surprising that the wages conform more to marginal product
for these workers than for their higher level counterparts.
Finally, panel 3 reports defined contribution plans. We hesitate to draw
any significantconclusions from this panel for tworeasons.First, there are
so few observations. Second, the Bankers' Trust studies do not really report
theappropriate information for defined contribution plans so these
calculations are more likely to be a function of interpretations made by them
and by me. The one obvious feature is that definitionally, a defined
contribution plan cannot decline in present value with age of retirement since
the worker is always entitled to the present value of his contributions.
Since contributions are never negative, that value must grow with age of
retirement (although not necessarily at the same rate).
It is also true that pensions associated with retirement after the normal
age should follow the same pattern of decline with age. Most of the sample22
was subject to mandatory retirement, but 13 conventional plans did allow the
worker to elect to remain beyond the date of normal retirement. Table 4
presents information on those individuals. Since the pattern is similar
across salary and tenure groups, we only report those calculations for a
representative group with salary =25000and tenure =30.The pattern of
declining pension values is the same and smooth both before and after normal
retirement.
It is interesting that this group for which there is no mandatory
retirement have more steeply declining pensions than the group which does not
distinguish on the basis of mandatory retirement. Compare ERAT(t) in table
4 with that for the corresponding group (salary =30000,tenure =30)in table
3 and it is clear that pensions decline more rapidly in table 4. This
suggests that reductions in pensions are an alternative to mandatory
retirement .
The1975 cross—section provides a basis for comparison. Results for the
representative group are reported in table 5. In comparing these values with
those for the appropriate groups in table 3, two things stand out. First, for
pattern plans, the pensions are higher in the 1980 cross—section than in the
1975 cross—section while the reverse is true for conventional plans. Second,
the decline in pension value with age of retirement is sharper in 1975 than in
1980 for pattern plans while the reverse is true for conventional plans. We
defer attempts to explain these findings until after discussion of the matched
sample since these differences may simply reflect random sampling variation
across firms rather than trends over time.
The one obvious feature is again that the expected present value of
pension benefits decline with increases in the age of retirement. Both years
provide strong support of that conclusion. Again, this is consistent with the23
idea that pensions function as severance pay in an efficient compensation
scheme.
There are some obvious institutional differences between the 1980 period
and 1975. The most obvious is that the primary social security benefit
against which manybenefitformulas are offset, increased between 1975 and
1980.In order to determine the effect of social security on the
calculations, the 1980 analysis was repeated, plugging in the 1975 primary
socialsecurity formula. Since that value was lower than the 1980 value
pensions increased. That is, some benefit formulas usually subtract some
fractionof social security benefits from pension payments. Over time the
amowit subtracted has increased. Table 6, col. 2 presents the results for the
representative group (salary =25000,tenure =30).
Pension benefits for 1980 in column 2 with the 1975 social security
formula are about 7% higher than those using the 1980 formula for conventional
plans. Although it is difficult to state the increase in primary social
security benefits as a scalar, for the average worker that increase amounted
to 68%. Thus the "elasticity" of the mean of pension benefits with respect to
social security benefits is .1 •Itis less than 1 primarily for two
reasons: First, not all plans offset social security payments. Second, even
those that do offset benefits do not do so fully. No pattern plans had social
security offset provisions.
A general point is that because of the way that benefits are offset
against social security primary benefits, any change in those benefits have
major impacts on pensions and therefore on retirement and tax revenues, We do
not explore those implications here.
The rate of inflation, wage growth, and nominal interest rates were
different in 1980 than they were in 1975. In fact, one could argue that24
earnings growth of 5% per year for old workers and a nominal rate of interest
of 15% axe more reasonable. Column 3 of table 6 reports the results on the
1980 data using these assumptions.
Although the values change somewhat, the qualitative conclusions remain
essentially unchanged. Pension values decline significantly with age.
Incidentally, the reason that values are so much lower for conventional plans
under the revised assumptions is that wage growth of 5% implies that an
individual who retires ten years early has a salary of $15,348 rather than
$250000. Since conventional pians are contingent upon final salary, benefits
fall. At normal retirement, values are lower because of higher discount
rates. Only the latter consideration affects pattern plans, causing their
decline to be steepened substantially. The reasoning is not quite so
straightforward, however, since these are means of highly nonlinear
functions
Finally, as a last check on the robustness of the results, the analysis
was repeated under the assumption that the nominal interest rate was only
5%. Col. 4 of table 6 contains those results.
With a nominal interest rate of 5%, the decline in pension value does not
occur until about six years before normal retirement for the respresentative
group. However, for groups with longer tenure (40) the decline occurs
throughout the period for conventional plans and during the last nine years
for pattern plans. Moreover, in 1980, a nominal discount rate of 5% is surely
well below the feasible range since short rates were above 20% and 30—year
mortgage rate were around 16%. It is difficult to believe that 5% was the
anticipated discount rate.25
The Matched Sample:
Any of the differences noted above may have been the result of random
differences in the cross-section rather than true time variations. To
eliminate that source of confusion, 70 plans have been matched across the two
yearsand this section reports findings based on that sample.
The major changes occured for pattern plans. In the matched sample,
there was an increase in pension values of about 50% for normal retirement and
over 100% for retirement ten years early. Since pattern plans are independent
of final salary, it is not surprising that their values should increase in
nominal terms over the period. However, two points are interesting. First,
certainly for early retirement, but even for normal retirement the increase
probably exceeds the increase in prices so that some of the gain is real, not
nominal. Second, the decline in pension benefits with early retirement seems
to have steepened sharply over the five year period, reflected in the 1004%
gain for early and only 504% gain for normal retirement.
Again this may reflect a substitution of pension reductions for mandatory
retirement in light of changes in the Age Discrimination in nploymemnt Act.
Of course, if pensions acted perfectly as an efficient severance pay device
there would be no need for mandatory retirement at all. The inability to
induce both efficient layoffs and quitting simultaneously provides a role for
mandatory retirment and its restriction works in the direction of inducing
more worker—initiated separations.
The results for conventional plans suggest a different pattern. Although
differences are small, the benefits have, if anything, declined over time.
This should not be taken at face value. More than this decline can be
attributed to changes in social security. The maximum decline here is less
than 5% and the mean decline due to social security was estimated at 7%. But26
more important is that conventional plans depend upon final salary which
increases over time with inflation. This table makes comparisons based on
equality of salary in nominal terms. But using the information in table 3, we
can adjust the pension benefits to take this into account.
At tenure=30, an increase in salary from $25000 to $50,000 increases
135,577 —63,165 normal retirement value by
63,165 or 114%. Therefore we can
estimate that each dollar increase in final salary at tenure30 increases
normal retirement pension value by $1.14. If the average final salary in
these firms grew say 30% over the five year period, normal pension value would
be expected to increase from $61,907 in 1975 to (61.232)(1.30)(1.14) =
$90,745in 1980. This would be an increase of 47%. This increase is about
the same as that for pattern plans over the same period.
A similar exercise can be performed to correct the present value of
retirement ten years early. Under the same assumptions, this results in an
estimated pension value of 143,886 in 1980 based on the 1975 salary of
$25,000. This is an increase of 40% so the steepening of the decline in
pension values for pattern plans does not seem to be duplicated for
conventional plans •6
Summarizing, pattern plans on average pay 50% more at normal retirement
and 100% more on ten years early retirement than in 1975. Conventional plans
are estimated to pay 47% on ten years early retirement than they did in
1975. In both years and under any reasonable assumptions, the expected
present value of pensions tend to decline with increases in the age of
retirement.27
An Alternative Explanation and Other Issues:
Throughout the model it was assumed that workers were risk neutral.
However, if workers are risk averse, then another explanation for the decline
in pension value with age of retirement is available. When a worker begins
employment, he may not know whether or not he will become ill and be forced to
retire before the normal age. Since illness is a bad event, workers may wish
to insure against that cnotingency by paying higher pensions to early
retirees.
At some levels, this story is not inconsistent with the model. Eqs. (1)—
(7) would have to be modified to take utility rather than alternative use of
time into account. But the pension still acts as severance pay and induces
workers to leave when appropriate. Appropriate carries a different meaning,
however. Now, workers cannot be induced to leave if and only if the
alternative use of time exceeds the value of the worker to the fix-in.To do so
distroys the role of severance pay as an insurance device. This well—known
result appears in many places,7 but its point carries with it two implications
for this analysis. First, severance pay does not induce efficient separation
in the sense of a first best, perfect information optimum. Second, and as the
result, the decline in pension value with retirement age is not an accurate
measure of the difference between wage aid marginal product. In fact, it
overstates that value because some of the payment for early retirement is
insurance.
There are a number of arguments which suggest that the insurance story is
somewhat less plausible. First, there are other forms of insurance, some
provided by the firmandother by a third party, which seem to be set up
explicitly to handle these contingencies. Health insurance and more to the28
pointdisabilityinsurance perform exactly those functions. It is not clear
why a declining pension value should be required to play the same role.
Second, if pensions act as insurance, one would think that there would be
no reason to prevent workers from taking them early. But most pension plans
severly limit the age of early retirement. This is not true in general for
health insurance and disability insurance. If pensions are an incentive
device, it is easier to rationalize the unwillingness to pay pensions to early
retirees.
Third, most pensions that are based on salary use the final few years
salary as the basis of computation. If insurance were the motive, a lifetime
average which more closely reflects expected permanent income wouldbe
appropriate. In fact, with insurance, a case could be made for a negative
relationship between final salary and pension, given lifetime income, because
of the inability of the older disabled worker to adjust to the fall in income.
Fourth, the decline in pension values is steepest for high income, white
collar workers who have conventional rather than pattern plans. Yet one might
argue that itis theblue collar workers who have both riskier jobs and fewer
alternativeforms of insurance. Although insurance may be a partial motive
for pension values which decline with age of retirement, itseemsdifficult to
believe that this is a major factor in the explanation.
Conclusion
The expected present value of pension benefits generally declines with
the age of retirement. This phenomenon is easily explained if one views the
pensions as a form of severance pay rather than as a tax—deferred savings
account. Further, the real value of pension benefits have remained constant
orincreased in real terms over the period between 1975 and1980 eventhough29
the same is probably not true for older workerst real earnings. Finally,
there is some evidence to suggest that higher pensions for early retirement
are being used as a substitute for mandatory retirement clauses in labor
Contracts.30
Footnotes
1Thisanalysis marries the models presented inLazear (1981) and Halland
Lazear (1982).
more general formulation allows the severance payment to vary with the
identity of the party who initiates the separation. Hall and Lazear consider
this case and discuss its drawbacks.
3That the entire remaining stream must be examined is recognized in
Fields and Mitchell (1981). Bulow (1981) also points oit (as my calculations
implicitly do) that the "true" current wage also includes the value of
changing the pension as the result of working that period.
4See also Burkhauser and Qiinn (1981).
5E.g., for some ages the mean rises even though no one plan ever rose.
The nonlinearities makes some plans fall by less than others.
6There was only one matched defined contribition p.an.
7To name a few, see Arnott and Stiglitz (1981), Azariadis (1980), Gree
(1981), Green and Kalu(1981),Grossman andHart (1981)and (198lb).31
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Momentsof the Expected Present Value
of NormalRetirementBenefits
(Sample Selection criterion: EPV—0 valid)
Standard
Group Mean Deviation N
All 55690 50636 2646
Salary Tenure
9000 20 17102 8063 218
9000 30 25209 11144 220
9000 40 32676 14610 221
15000 20 23054 10597 220
15000 30 34167 14100 220
15000 40 44020 18027 221
25000 20 37367 19140 221
25000 30 55353 26110 221
25000 40 70779 32897 221
50000 20 75730 44270 221
50000 30 111368 61755 221
50000 40 140551 77253 22134
Table 2
1975 Data
Moments of Expected Present Value
of Normal Retirement Benefits
(Sample Criterion: EPV—0 valid)
Standar4
GrQup Mean Deviation N
All 55690 50636 2646
Salary Tenure
9000 10 10624 3921 192
9000 20 20864 7700 194
9000 30 30403 11411 183
15000 10 16416 7008 194
15000 20 31359 14116 204
15000 30 47369 20118 186
25000 10 26125 13869 199
25000 20 51337 26328 206
25000 30 76989 39165 188
50000 10 50931 31338 205
50000 20 101462 60683 206












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Benefits are Independent of Final Salary)
Tenure
Variable 20 30 40
EPV—10 20450 40651 64349
EPV—9 21085 40103 61913
EPV—8 21513 39296 59276
EPV—7 21704 38262 56477
EPV—6 21667 37031 53554
EPV—5 21454 36164 51868
EPV—4 21053 34485 48489
EPV—3 20498 32716 45117
EPV—2 19730 30752 41577
EPV—1 18863 28767 38430
EPV—0 17982 26876 35361
ERAT—lO 1.113 1.491 1.810
ERAT—9 1.150 1.473 1.743
ERAT—8 1.176 1.446 1.670
ERAT—7 1.189 1.410 1.592
ERAT-6 1.190 1.367 1.510
ERAT—5 1.180 1.334 1.461
ERAT—4 1.161 1.274 1.367
ERAT—3 1.132 1.210 1.272
ERAT—2 1.092 1.140 1.173
ERAT—1 1.047 1.068 1.085




(Benefits are Independent of Final Salary)
Tenure
Variable 20 30 40
WVDIFF—10 —244 211 939
WVDIFF—9 —181 342 1118
WVDIFF—8 —89 482 1305
WVDIFF—7 13 631 1500
WVDIFF—6 126 489 951
WVDIFF—5 249 1042 2098
WVDIFF—4 378 1208 2303
WVDIFF—3 577 1475 2659
WVDIFF—2 716 1640 2600
WVDIFF—1 801 1718 2789
NORMAL 2766 4123 5421



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1980 Expected Present Value of Pension Benefits
Defined Benefit
Conventional Plans





















































EPV—10 125113 33779 62454
EPV—9 120062 32585 62016
EPV—8 114846 31215 62273
EPV—7 109373 29698 64556
EPV—6 103770 28059 67358
V—5 98161 26831 70045
EPV—4 92247 25215 72904
V—3 86338 23692 75589
EPV—2 80283 22017 77623
V—1 74422 20478 79395
EPV—0 65962 19007 80441
ERAT—lO 2.052 1.764 .782
ERAT—9 1.990 1.703 .779
ERAT—8 1.922 1.633 .785
ERAT—7 1.848 1.555 .812
ERAT—6 1.768 1.471 .846
ERAT—5 1.686 1.407 .878
ERAT—4 1.596 1.323 .913
ERAT—3 1.505 1.244 .945
ERAT—2 1.409 1.157 .969
ERAT—1 1.314 1.077 .989
















































































































1980 Expected PresentValue of Pensions
ComparativeAnalysis
Salary =25000,Tenure —30



































































EPV—10 107585 115384 75317 98194
!PV—9 10511 112624 72110 99791
v—s 101951 109222 68908 100673
EPV—7 98212 105190 65751 100866
V—6 94213 100945 62739 100629
EPV—5 90176 96537 60051 100129
V—4 85524 91512 56973 98769
EPV—3 80656 86313 53779 96880
V—2 75143 80482 50347 93876
EPV—1 69863 74810 47206 90727
V—0 63165 67749 43452 35261
SRAT—10 2.285 2.297 2.197 1.548
ERAT—9 2.212 2.221 2.070 1.558
ERAT—8 2.129 2.137 1.949 1.559
!RA—7 2.039 2.045 1.835 1.553
EAAT-6 1.944 1.949 1.728 1.540
ERAT—5 1.850 1.852 1.632 1.523
SRAT—4 1.747 1.748 1.531 1.496
SRAT—3 1.641 1.641 1.431 1.461
ERkr—2 1.522 1.523 1.326 1.409
ERAT—1 1.408 1.408 1.231 1.355
ERA'—0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000





Years Before Normal Retirement EPV8O V75 EPV80—V75
Conventional Plans
PV—10 99981 102380 —2399
V—9 97554 98815 —1261
SPV—8 94583 94874 —290
EPV—7 91241 92823 —1581
EPV—6 87617 88272 —654
V—5 84049 86952 —2902
EPV—4 79727 82376 —2649
EPV—3 75201 79034 —3832
EPV—2 70260 73616 —3355
PV—1 65715 68334 —2618
EPV—O 61232 61907 —675
N— 19
PatternPlane
EPV—10 43097 20199 22898
V—9 42476 20179 2296
EPV—8 41583 23283 18300
V—7 40451 2284 17609
EPV—6 39112 22261 16851
EPV—5 38660 25111 13548
EPV—4 36737 23818 12918
EPV—3 34729 22724 12005
EPV—2 32505 21272 11233
SPy—I 30274 19925 10349
EPV—0
N—